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Introduction
Alternative dispute resolution’s myriad potential for remedying our most pressing global 
concerns, while increasingly recognized by communities and a diverse array of professionals
around the world, is still largely unrecognized by scholars.  Its growing role with governance, the 
focus of this article, exemplifies.  Good governance is arguably our most pressing global need.2
One of the principal virtues of alternative dispute resolution3 (hereinafter “ADR”) is its 
contribution to democratic capacity building.4  “Democracy building is an intrinsic part of 
conflict management, and vice versa.”5 A recent article ambitiously asserts “(m)ediation6 as a 
catalyst for judicial reform” throughout Latin America.7 “Sustainable human development, 
economic growth, security, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution as well as good 
governance are all intricately intertwined.”8
2
 Tom Farer’s presentation, 2003.  Annual Meeting,  American Association of Law Schools.  In the 
simplest terms, good governance is effective democratic culture. See http://www.transparency.org.  Other 
attempts at defining good governance are presented in Section I of this article.  See, e.g., JULIUS COURT, 
GORAN HYDEN and KEN MEASE, ASSESSING GOVERNANCE: METHODOLOGICAL 
CHALLENGES 4 (2002).  
3
 Alternative dispute resolution encompasses a broad continuum of response to conflict that falls between 
avoidance and escalation.  LINDA SINGER, SETTLING DISPUTES:  CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN 
BUSINESS, FAMILIES, AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1994).  The response described here includes the 
most popular:  mediation, arbitration, multi stakeholder advisory and decision making process, integrative, 
or collaborative, negotiation, negotiated rule-making, and the office of ombuds.  Each process will be 
defined later in this article.
4ALISON TAYLOR AND JAY FOLBERG, MEDIATION:  A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO 
RESOLVING CONFLICT WITHOUT LITIGATION (1984) (“Using mediation to facilitate conflict 
resolution and encourage self-determination strengthens democratic values and enhances the dignity of 
those in conflict.”)    Section I elaborates values and variables commonly equated with “democratic.”
5
 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance at http://www.idea.int/utindex.cfm (last 
visited 9/3/04);  see also Aeyal M. Gross, The Constitution, Reconciliation, and Transitional Justice:  
Lessons From South Africa and Israel, 40 STAN. J. INT’L. L. 47, 56-57 (2004); JOHN DAVIES AND 
EDWARD KAUFMAN, SECOND TRACK/CITIZENS’ DIPLOMACY 3 (2002).
6
 Mediation is one form of ADR.  Its process will be elaborated throughout this article.  In the simplest 
terms, a third party, or mediator, assists parties negotiate resolution.  See, e.g., John Lande, How Will 
Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each Other?  24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839 (1997), citing
CHRISTOPHER MOORE, MEDIATION PROCESS, 8, 41, 53 (2d ed. 1996).  
7
 Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer & Emily Stewart Haynes, Mediation as a Catalyst for Judicial Reform in 
Latin America 18-3 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. (2003).
One of the mediators interviewed for this paper, working throughout the Pacific Rim, 
believes that “sophisticated parties are now no longer willing to allow a third party to…make 
decisions that impact on matters fundamental to their personal and business lives.”9  These 
stakeholders want to control their own disputes. Development experts concur, contending that 
sustainability requires participation and local ownership. Excessive reliance on outside experts 
has not worked.10  Likewise, the United States Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service 
believes that conflict prevention now requires leveraging “a wider range of approaches by a 
broader set of actors than in the past.”11  The growing popularity of global ADR, particularly 
arbitration12 and mediation, is impossible to ignore.13
ADR is remarkable in its parallels to and provision of processes recommended for good 
governance. The ombuds14 role, for example, is one of Transparency International’s publicized 
approaches to combating corruption.15  International commercial arbitration, as structured through 
8
 United Nations Development Programme, Management Development and Governance Division, Bureau 
for Policy Development, Promoting Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution Through Effective 
Governance at http:://magnet.undp.org/Docs/crisis/mapexercise.htm. (last visited 10/29/2003).
9
 Nancy Erbe, Survey Regarding ADR and Governance, (Pepperdine University School of Law, 2004).  
10
 UNDP, supra note 8 at 5.
11
 Andrea Strimling, The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service:  A Partner in International Conflict 
Prevention, 2 PEPP. L. REV. 418 (2002). 
12
 Traditionally, arbitration is a “private tribunal” created by contracting individuals to hear disputes in lieu 
of the courts.    Proceedings may look like court litigation but are informal, bound by less rules and not 
protected in the same ways.  For example, the right to appeal an arbitrator’s decision is more narrowly 
restricted than the right to appeal a judge’s decision within the United States.  ALAN RAU, EDWARD  F. 
SHERMAN and SCOTT R. PEPPET, PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 600 (2002).
13 See, e.g., Centre de Mediation et d’Arbitrage de Paris, Programme Grotius MARC 2000 at
http://www.cmap.asso.fr/. (surveying ADR throughout Europe);  Janet Murdock, Forging New Frontiers:  
Spreading ADR in Brazil, ACResolution 26 (2003);  Lynette Parker, Paper presentation, 2002.  Third 
International Conference on Conferencing, Circles and Restorative Practices, Minneapolis, Minnesota; 
Sally A. Harpole’s presentation, 2002.  Research Development Symposium, Barcelona Spain  (Ad hoc 
arbitration outnumbers the cases referred to arbitral institutions in jurisdictions like Indonesia, Singapore 
and Hong Kong.  Still, between 1994 and 2001, the number of cases submitted to the Hong Kong 
International Arbitration Commission more than doubled.  The number submitted to the China International 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission almost doubled between the two years of  1992 and 1993 
alone).
14
 “(One) who investigates complaints and mediates fair settlements, especially between aggrieved parties 
such as consumers or students and an institution or organization.” at http://dictionary.reference.com.
15
 Transparency International, supra note 2.
the New York Convention, “exports” rule of law and secures enforceability.16 ADR as a whole 
creates cross-cultural options that can be more impartial, fair and reliable than any one party’s 
courts.  Some cultures appreciate informal opportunities to resolve disputes interpersonally rather 
than formally in adversarial forums, even when forums are trustworthy.   The transnational 
corporate counsel interviewed for this paper has never encountered resistance to his contract 
provision that ADR be the exclusive mechanism for dispute resolution.17
This article argues that relationships between ADR and good governance deserve
scholarly scrutiny and guidance---aspiring to encourage ADR’s best contribution and guard
against abuses.  “(T)here is a dearth of works that go deeply beyond the rhetorical and give 
practical guidance on ways that governance systems and structures can address power 
inequality.”18 At the very least, attempts must to made to evaluate and theorize ADR’s impact on 
good governance.19
This article aims to begin filling this gap through surveying literature and interviewing a 
group of ADR experts actually working internationally and capable of providing rich guidance.  
The group includes:  1) an academic expert in the North American Free Trade Agreement and 
international commercial arbitration,  2)  ADR and law faculty consulting with business 
throughout Latin America,  3) a scholar from Northern Ireland with a focus on South Africa’s 
truth and reconciliation process,  4) the corporate counsel for a Fortune 500 transnational 
corporation, 5) a prominent entertainment lawyer, arbitrator and mediator with an international 
practice,  6) mediator working throughout the Pacific Rim, 7)  published expert on multi 
16
 JACK COE, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 19 (1997).
17
 When discussing ADR, however, he showed a strong working knowledge of arbitration alone---an 
interest in learning more about mediation but little understanding of and no experience with mediation.  
Surprisingly,  his standard ADR clause still provides for non-binding mediation before binding arbitration.  
Erbe, supra note 9.
18
 UNDP, supra note 8 at 4.
stakeholder environmental process who consults with the United Nations (hereinafter “UN”), 8) 
the former head of ADR for one of the leading United States (hereinafter “U.S.”) bar associations 
who has consulted internationally, 9) an artist-mediator who was born in Israel and continues to 
work there, 10) the Secretary General for an international NGO, 11) a restorative justice 
practitioner working internationally, with her focus in Latin America, and 12) the International 
Development Policy Officer for a member-country of the European Union.  Their perspective is 
integrated throughout this paper and shaped its organization.20
To lay a foundation for future research,21 this writing begins to identify the many
linkages, implicit and explicit, between ADR and good governance.  It intends to further 
19UNDP, supra note 8 at 4. (“(T)here is a very real need for a major text that synthesizes the disparate 
lessons of individual cases into some broad sets of conclusions.”)
20
 One interviewee notes that practitioners too often fail to share lessons learned.  Erbe, supra note 9.
21Establishing ADR’s success in reducing systemic corruption, and otherwise building good governance, 
requires sophisticated longitudinal inquiry attempting to document less tangible macro change.  
Evaluating and measuring good governance alone is a complex undertaking.  JULIUS COURT, GORAN 
HYDEN and KEN MEASE, ASSESSING GOVERNANCE: METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES 2, 4 
(2002) ( “Measuring issues of governance poses challenges that are not encountered in the economic or 
social development fields.  While it is easier to provide firm indicators of such things as economic growth 
or primary school enrollment, it is much more difficult to find and agree upon indicators of a political 
macro development like governance….Perhaps because it is a broad and complicated concept, there exists 
no regular, systemic and cohesive data collection effort centered on the concept of governance.”) 
Measuring development shows parallel challenges.  Analyses exist of failure, but “it is not easy 
to…determine which factors accounted for success.” United Nations Development Programme, 
Management Development and Governance Division, Bureau for Policy Development, CAPACITY 
DEVELOPMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: CONCEPTUAL AND 
OPERATIONAL SIGNPOSTS 6 and 56 (July 1997) at http://magnet.undp.org/cdrb/Techpap2.htm. (“The 
process is non-linear.  It is a learning and experimenting process in which people test ideas, gain 
experience, and feed back their experience into the process…”)  Existing evaluation of ADR focuses on 
relatively straightforward disputes.   See, e.g., Naimark, Richard W. and Keer, Stephanie E., International 
Private Commercial Arbitration:  Expectations and Perceptions of Attorneys and Business People INT’L.   
BUS. L. 203 (2002).  Simple studies offer valuable information and insight but only begin to tackle the 
challenges involved with correlating ADR and good governance. The article cited earlier exemplifies, 
providing persuasive argument for judicial reform throughout Latin America, but failing to establish that 
ADR is catalyzing change apart from providing alternative to corrupt process.  This research gap may 
reflect barriers inherent in studying ADR.  With arbitration and mediation, confidentiality agreements block 
collection of comprehensive data.  Researchers are forced to rely on anecdotal selective reports by parties 
concerned.   Fortunately, despite the challenges, research is beginning to analyze more complex multilateral 
negotiations. See, e.g.,  Mary Jo Larson, Low-Power Contributions in Multilateral Negotiations:  A 
Framework Analysis, 19 NEGOT. J. 133,139 (2003) (“An understanding of multilateral negotiations 
requires a comprehensive and systemic perspective, one that recognizes multilevel structures, a variety of 
processes and the different roles of different actors.”) 
introduce ADR’s international contribution to ADR academics and practitioners.  Simultaneously, 
it aspires to benefit those instrumental to international development, through introducing the most 
evolved conflict process.  
This article contends that the time is ripe for scholars to note trends and concerns with 
ADR and good governance.  Part I defines good governance.  Contemporary definitions
acknowledge the many players and domains of governance that requiring coordination today.  
Overriding variables necessary to evaluate good governance across domains are identified.  
Part II introduces the most important criteria for evaluating whether ADR is truly 
democratic.  ADR’s potential for either eroding or advancing good governance is recognizeded.  
The stakeholder responsibilities obligatory for good governance are outlined.
Part III further explores the relationships between ADR and democratic capacity 
building.  Democratic ADR, where all concerned design, is reiterated.  Naturally, truly inclusive 
process is “easier said than done,” especially with power difference.  Several pragmatic ideas are 
proposed.
Part IV tackles the challenge of motivating and monitoring transparency and 
responsiveness with those who hold most power.  Citizens must have means to verify government 
responsibility, integrity and service.  Specific accounts where ADR has increased transparency 
are described.  ADR’s inherent potential for crafting and ensuring responsiveness is also
explored.  
Part V heralds the role of multi-stakeholder process in convening the broad participation 
and voice of the many concerned, involved and impacted by a particular decision or dispute.  It 
names  two examples of inclusive participatory process.  It discerns several process challenges, 
with ideas for rectifying with real world decisions.
Part VI stresses ADR’s capacity for mediating diverse interests, building relationships,
and creating durable resolution.  It cautions that prioritizing efficiency of dispute resolution can 
create rather than resolve problems.  Somehow efficiency and relationships must be balanced for 
superlative partnering.  
Part VII recognizes the central role played by law with good governance--- when 
enforced impartially.  Several countries, however, lack assurance of neutral enforcement, and are 
turning to ADR, particularly mediation, arbitration, and arbitration-mediation, to create
trustworthy forums.  ADR, like formal legal systems, must be scrutinized to ensure impartiality in 
practice.
Part VIII reemphasizes the importance of independent oversight to ensure accountability, 
with a particular look at the ombuds office created by the International Finance Corporation 
(hereinafter “IFC”) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (hereinafter “MIGA”).  
All concerned must guard accountability.  Embracing this seemingly endless challenge reaps 
critical rewards.  
I. Good Governance Defined.
While the natural interpretation of good governance starts with the state of government 
around the world, in light of shifting international realities, good governance must encompass 
what former Ambassador McDonald coined “multi track diplomacy,”22 or the influence and role 
of NGOs,23  professional and ethnic groups, business,24 citizens, academia, activists, religion, 
philanthropy25 and media, as well as government.26  Negotiations between these key players27
influence, and often determine, the state of good governance globally.28
22
 Davies and Kaufman, supra note 5 at 49. (“(Multi-track) diplomacy may be broadly defined as the 
bringing together of professionals, opinion leaders or other currently or potentially influential individuals 
from communities in conflict, without official representative status, to work together to understand better 
the dynamics underlying the conflict and how its transformation from violence (or potential violence) to a 
collaborative process of peace building and sustainable development might be promoted.  It complements 
“first track” or official diplomacy…when official dialogue is blocked or constrained….(and) is increasingly 
recognized as an essential in a multilayered diplomatic process aimed at transforming the contentious 
power dynamics of complex, protracted conflict into processes of constructive engagement and joint 
problem solving.” ) 
23 In a recent global survey, NGOs were ranked as the second “most publicly trusted group or 
organization,” second only to national militaries. Kumi Naidoo, Civil Society, Governnance and 
Globalization, 2003.  The World Bank Group Presidential Fellows Lecture Series, Wash. D.C.;  see also
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/bspan/PresentationView.asp?PID=133&EID=63.  
24
 General Electric, as one example, is credited with promoting peaceful conflict resolution of the 2002 
nuclear showdown between India and Pakistan. Timothy L. Fort and Cindy A. Schipani, ADAPTING 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE  62 (2003).
25
 Philanthropy has great influence. Private funders supported international tribunals adjudicating Holocaust 
claims as one noteworthy example.  Norbert Wuhler’s Lecture, 2003. Master’s Forum, Straus Institute for 
Dispute Resolution. On the other hand, poor coordination is judged as key to failure of donor-driven 
development efforts.  UNDP, supra note 8 at 7. In one reported case, United States Aid for International 
Development funded a restorative justice dispute resolution process in Colombia. Yet when a restorative 
justice expert from the  United States visited Colombia and asked about the program, no one had heard of 
it.  Lynette Parker, Restorative Justice:  A Vehicle for Reform?, paper presentation, 2004.  Annual Meeting 
of Latin American Studies Association, Las Vegas, Nevada.
26
 Mark E. Warren, Civil Society and Good Governance, U.S. CIVIL SOCIETY PROJECT (1999);
see also UNDP, supra note 8 (“Capacity development has concentrated on governments with little or no 
attention to the need to develop the capacities of the other…partners, whose contributions are critical for 
the success of national development programmes, such as civil society and the private sector.”)
27 The UNES CAP acknowledges government as one formal actor along with many others, formal and 
informal, such as associations of farmers, political parties, labor unions, finance institutions, organized 
crime syndicates, and multinational corporations. Strimling, supra note 11 at 424.
28
   A recent World Governance survey proceeded accordingly, surveying government, academic, business, 
NGO, legal, media and religious “well-informed persons.”  Court, Hyden and Mease, supra note 2 at 15.
There is a shift taking place in our understanding and practice of
governance.  Governance used to be principally about what 
governments do.  Today, the concept is increasingly about 
balancing the roles, responsibilities, accountabilities and 
capabilities of different levels of government---local, national,
regional and global;  and different actors or sectors in society---
public, private and civil society organizations and individual
citizens….  In today’s world this framework consists of a wide
variety of mechanisms, processes, institutions and relationships
(including partnerships).29
ADR’s natural overlap is undeniable. The United Nations Economic and Social 
Commissions for Asia and Pacific (hereinafter “UNESCAP”) defines good governance as “the 
process of decision making and the process by which decisions are implemented…It is the
complex mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions through which citizens and groups 
articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations, and mediate their differences.”30
Eight interdependent characteristics are most often identified with good governance:  
1) participation, by both men and women, directly or through intermediate institutions and 
representatives,31 with freedom of association and expression,32 2)  rule of law,  including human 
29
 The Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum, 1996.
30(emphasis added) United Nations Development Programme, Reconceptualizing Governance  (1997); see 
also MARITA THORNHILL, JEREMY EVANS, ROD BULMAN and IAN SAMPSON, THE 
ENVIRONMENT AS CATALYST:  UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTL GOVERNANCE FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 2 at http://www.earth-info-net.com/2002_12_01__archive.html., citing 
Kooiman. (“All those interactive arrangements in which public as well as private actors participate aimed at 
solving social problems, or creating social opportunities, and attending to the institutions within which 
these governing activities take place”).
31
 UNDP, supra note 8 at 23.
rights,33 enforced impartially with independence34 and no corruption,35 3) transparency with those 
affected and media,36 4) consensus, or mediation of diverse interests, to decide the best interest 
of whole communities, with consideration of long term sustainability,37 5) equal inclusive 
decision making,  6) efficient effectiveness, or best use of resources, 7) responsiveness to 
stakeholders,38 and 8) accountability.39
Coordination among multiple stakeholders is fundamental to elevating good 
governance.40 In 1992 the UN Conference on Environment and Development—the Rio Earth 
Summit, as one example, prioritized partnerships as central to achieving global sustainable 
development.
(O)nly with a comprehensive and widespread cross-sector
collaboration can we ensure that sustainable development
initiatives are imaginative, coherent and integrated 
enough to tackle the most intractable problems.  Single 
sector approaches have been tried and proved
32 See, e.g., Gleditsch, Kristian S. and Michael D. Ward, Double Take:  A Re-examination of Democracy 
and Autocracy in Modern Politics, 361-82 J. CONFLICT RESOL.  41 (1997); see  also 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm#data (measuring “autocracy” and “democracy” in most 
independent states).
33Minorities and the most vulnerable must be considered and optimally included in decision making.  
FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD (2004); see also www.freedomhouse.org. (surveying 
human rights).
34
 UNDP, supra note 8.
35 See, e.g., Luis Pasara, Judicial Reform and Civil Society,  JUSTICE DELAYED: JUDICIAL REFORM 
IN LATIN AMERICA 83, (1998), cited by Moyer and Haynes, supra note 7.
36
 Id.  (“(G)ood decisions require access to good information”).
37
  Focus on increasing the privilege of a few elite rather than the greatest well-being of many destabilizes.
38
 Stakeholder is broadly defined to include “any group or individuals who can affect, or is affected.”   
CAROLINE NELIGAN, INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH EXTERNAL 
STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 4 (2003). 
disappointing. Working separately, different sectors have
developed activities in isolation—sometimes competing
with each other and/or duplicating efforts and wasting
valuable resources.  Working separately has all too often
led to the development of a ‘blame culture’ in which
chaos or neglect is always regarded as someone else’s
fault.41
Once again, ADR’s contribution to good governance is palpable.  ADR, at its best, inherently 
promotes effective partnering.
I. ADR Must Honor Minimal Criteria To Be Truly Democratic.
As various ADR processes from around the world are reviewed, themes emerge, illuminating 
the qualities necessary to advance good governance.  ADR’s potential for either heightening or 
eroding good governance is linked to its conscious scrutiny of potential power abuse.  Specific 
admonitions are provided throughout this article.
39
 Strimling, supra note 11;  Paula Dobriansky, Principles of Good Governance,  ECON.  PERSP. (2003) 
(“Development cannot flourish where people cannot make their voices heard, human rights are not 
respected, information does not flow, and civil society and the judiciary are weak.”)  
40
 Strimling, supra note 11 at 424.
41
  University of Cambridge and International Business Leaders Forum, Partnership Matters  3 (2003).
First and foremost, credible organization of negotiating teams (mediation, ombuds and multi 
stakeholder) includes all important players.42  Some process must “ensure that no significant 
interest is left out or omitted.”43
Once all are included, their input must be considered and respected regardless of external 
power.  Attention must be paid to how decisions are made, “lest the powerful simply overrun the 
weak which may well be the large populace.”44  If, on the other hand, authentic power-sharing 
occurs, heightened responsiveness to the populace, or good governance, naturally occurs.  
Next, democratic ADR requires parallel information sharing, or transparency.  True impartial 
oversight, through rule of law, or third parties like ombuds, ensures good faith accountability.  
Verified transparency secures ADR’s solid contribution to good governance.  
Conditions are interdependent. ADR’s influence is necessarily complex. For example, 
transparency and accountability require participation.  One World Trust combines several of these 
conditions in its Global Accountability Project, where it assesses the transparency and inclusive 
decision making of our most powerful international actors, including transnational corporations, 
intergovernmental organizations and NGOs.45
Stakeholder relationship to ADR, as it influences good governance, will  be explored 
throughout this article. The Cross-Sector Partnership Initiative posits civil society as instrumental 
to inclusive participation and accountability for the public good, the public sector, or government, 
42
 Unfortunately, a number of instances can be cited with no or weak attempts at such organization.   Philip 
Harter,  A Plumber Responds To The Philosophers:  A Comment On Professor Menkel-Meadow’s Essay On 
Deliberative Democracy, N.L.J.  (forthcoming).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45
 Neligan, supra note 38.
as responsible for rule of law, including transparent access to information, and business as driving 
efficient effectiveness.  All ideally provide service responsive to public need and interest.46
Transnational corporations, however, have been involved, directly and indirectly, in the most 
violent and challenging of disputes, particularly in developing countries with oil, gas and mineral 
resources.  In one instance, guerrilla groups extorted money from contractors in Colombia.47  Oil 
and gas rents can support corrupt governance.  Even though Shell invested more than $33 million 
per year in community development for the Niger Delta, critics allege corrupt officials and 
contractors siphoned off much of the money and Shell aimed to “buy favors.”48  In a related 
example, a 2002 lawsuit claimed several corporations and banks in effect aided and abetted South 
Africa’s apartheid government through their investments.49
Thus developing civic society strong enough to weaken, or at least check, authoritarian 
government’s monopoly of power is key to preventing reversion to violence.50 Democracy is 
advocated as “an efficient structural means of managing and preventing violent conflict.”51
Recent scholars go so far as to advocate the United Nations’ vision of the culture of peace, 
sounding much like good governance:  “a society characterized by human rights, tolerance, free 
46
 University of Cambridge, supra note 41.
47
 Business Partners for Development, COMPANIES IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS:  A ROLE FOR TRI-
SECTOR PARTNERSHIPS?  (2001). Corporations  risk accusations of human rights violations through 
the acts of contractors and acquiescence or other involvement.
48 Id. 
49
 Penelope E. Andrews, Reparations for Apartheid Victims:  The Path to Reconciliation? 53 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1155, 1163 (2004).
50
 Aneta Wierzynska, Consolidating Democracy Through Transitional Justice:  Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts, 
79 N.Y.U. REV. 1934 (2004).  Strong citizens are less likely to be manipulated by governments leading  
violence.  Wierzynska cites Rummel’s study, concluding that “every instance of mass murder by a state 
against its own people has happened under authoritarian rule.” Id.  Rwanda is a classic example, ripe for 
manipulation. Additional research provides striking correlation between corruption and violence.  
Countries ranked highest for corruption resolved disputes with violence sixty percent of the time, while 
countries ranked lowest used violence fourteen percent of the time.
51 Id.
flow of information, non-violence, sustainable development, peace education, and equality of 
men and women.”52
II.   ADR’s  Role In Transitional Emerging Democracies.
International experts increasingly advocate the processes of alternative dispute resolution, 
or “transformative party-driven…bottom-up” conflict work.53 Some stress the importance of 
“allowing conflicts to be raised, fought over and resolved.”54 Those interviewed for this article 
recognize training in dispute resolution skills as “premium.”  They commend training in
negotiation, cross-cultural communication, process awareness, strategic thinking, group 
facilitation, trust, and team-building.55
A. ADR Fills Critical Global Gaps While Building Democratic Capacity.
Dispute leaders go so far as to contend that ADR plays an instrumental role in emerging 
democracies.  In many parts of the world, radical new participatory institutions are needed to 
elevate good governance.   Some communities assert that the practice of ADR is introducing a 
52
 Susan Opotow, Psychology of Impunity and Injustice:  Implications for Social Reconciliation, POST-
CONFLICT JUSTICE (2002).
53
 Robert A. Baruch Bush, Realizing the Potential of International Conflict Work:  Connections Between 
Practice and Theory 19 NEGOT. J. 97 (2003);  A. Marco Turk, Democratized Restorative Justice As A 
Lesson For Criminology:  Cyprus 1997-2003 29 CRIM. (2004) (though diplomatic elites appear to lack 
faith in civil society and constrain themselves to traditional legal and political process).
54
 UNDP, supra note 8 at 23.
55
 Erbe, supra note 9.
culture of peace into their violent societies.56  The “nearly decade-old ‘Inter-Tajik Dialogue’ that 
moved Tajikistan ‘from civil war toward civil society’ exemplifies.57
Post war reconstruction is also embracing facilitative process at the community level, with 
a focus on development.58   Lebanon is one archetype.  Intra-community and inter-religious 
dialogue is being used to elicit local views, guide expression in constructive ways, bring local and 
national leaders together on priority issues of shared concern, and create ideas for reconciliation.59
Back channel negotiations have purportedly increased inter-communal understanding.60 A 
community relations board is planned that will facilitate local dispute resolution.61
Collaborative approaches fill critical gaps in legal capacity. Consequently, international 
mediations have increased threefold over recent decades.62 Intra-national and cross-ethnic 
disputes often fall outside international authority.  Without alternatives like those mentioned here, 
minority ethnic groups may see their only alternative as violent effort for independence, to form 
their own nation-states.63
56
 Parker, supra note 25.
57
 HAROLD SAUNDERS, A PUBLIC PEACE PROCESS:  SUSTAINED DIALOGUE TO 
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making by a global elite exercising coercion rather than negotiation, is predictably criticized.)
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The international experts interviewed for this article stress proactive conflict prevention 
and transitional justice including local community leadership, particularly those representing the 
groups historically most excluded or marginalized in decision making.64 “[B]efore…any 
consensus process…can claim democratic legitimacy, one must know among whom the 
consensus was struck and that it in fact represented the consent of those whose assent is 
necessary.”65 ADR plays a foundational role in advancing good governance if the range of 
concerned, impacted and interested stakeholders design.66  Baruch found the most satisfied parties 
to mediation reported the highest process control, participation in decision-making, as well as full 
expression.67  Similar results are found with negotiated rule-making.68  Consciously creating 
space for dialogue, communication and positive debate increases civil society buy-in, or 
ownership of dispute resolution and resultant responsibility for necessary change.69  Both are
essential to sustain reform.70 “People are more ready to accept decisions that go against them if 
they have a part in the decision-making process.”71
To varying degrees, relative to the formality or informality of the process, arbitration, 
mediation and arbitration/mediation hybrids allow parties from different countries, cultures and 
legal systems to craft process that includes a variety of approaches to conflict and thus aims to 
respect all concerned.72  While facing difference can be difficult, those involved receive essential 
64
 Erbe, supra note 9.
65
 Harter, supra note 44.  
66 Id.   “[B]efore…any consensus process…can claim democratic legitimacy, one must know among whom 
the consensus was struck and that it in fact represented the consent of those whose assent is necessary.”
67
 R.A. Baruch Bush, What Do We Need A Mediator For?:  Mediation’s ‘Value Added’ for Negotiators, 12 
OH. ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 1 (1997).
68
 Harter, supra note 42 at 7;  Wierzynska, supra note 50 at 1942. 
69
 Parker, supra note 27.
70 Id.
71
 Harter, supra note 42.
72
 Coe, supra note 16 at 108.
opportunities to gain understanding, transform costly destructive attitudes,73 build bridges and 
balance between rights and responsibilities, and create lasting resolution.74
According to Susan Collin-Marks, South Africa’s Peace Accords included everyone as 
equals.  “In  many cases the government became just another player, not a referee or participant 
with extra powers….One international observer…was astonished at the government’s readiness 
to be equal partners at the table…”75
Legal ethicists assert that rule of law alone does not and cannot create the virtues or 
character required for good governance.76  ADR, in contrast, provides concrete opportunities for 
individuals to wrestle with ethical decision making, understand others’ perspectives, express their 
own interests,  and otherwise develop democratic capacities.  When the mediator-arbitrator, for 
example, gives the parties an opportunity to mediate and reach their own agreement before 
sharing her arbitral award, all parties receive an equal and public opportunity to be heard and hear 
all concerned.
B.  Toward Inclusive Power Sharing Required For Democratic ADR.
Even though the United Nations  Economic Commission for Europe’s (hereinafter 
“UNECE”) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and 
73
 Buck-passing, elitism and dogmatism are named as attitudinal barriers within Nigeria’s government as 
one example. University of Cambridge, supra note 41 at 18.
74
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Access to Justice in Environmental Matter (hereinafter “AARHUS”)  is noted for its allowance of 
NGOs as equal partners, it is critiqued for its apparent failure to identify all necessary 
stakeholders, particularly those representing the general public, the interests of economic and 
social development, and others affected by the process.77  Environmental NGOs may have 
dominated the process, particularly “a handful of Western NGOs with a very clear agenda.”78
The lawyers and academics present were aligned with these NGOs.  It is uncertain whether 
business interests were involved at all. 79 NGOs may attempt to circumvent coordination of 
government and intergovernmental bodies, along with business, perceiving that well-coordinated 
government or business involvement dominates process and distorts outcomes.80
The ombuds for the IFC and MIGA capture the challenge in their annual report 
describing multi stakeholder process.81  “The reality is that there is often a huge gap between the
resources, power and cultures of the private sector companies which undertake IFC/MIGA 
projects and the communities which are impacted by them.  One of our basic jobs is to help IFC 
and/or MIGA to bridge that gap.”82
Recognized is the potential to threaten those with most power. 
77MINU HEMMATI, MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PROCESSES FOR GOVERNANCE  AND 
SUSTAINABILITY:  BEYOND DEADLOCK AND CONFLICT 122-124 (2002).  (One NGO forecasts a 
future lawsuit).
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It is not easy for any major institution—be it a multinational
corporation, a government agency, or a major financial
institution---to become comfortable and proficient in 
doing business in a climate of escalating expectations
regarding transparency, public trust, and accountability….
Senior management…will…contribute…best when there is
sufficient sophistication within the corporate and on-site
team to support healthy long-term enlightened self-interest.83
One of the practitioners interviewed for this paper, a mediator working throughout the Pacific 
Rim, sees the greatest challenge with global dispute resolution as mediation’s evolution “from an 
ad hoc process to a more institutionalized one, whether that be within large global corporations, 
state court systems, or government to government.”84
C. Building Optimal Conditions.
Despite the difficulties, attempting serious conversation and collaboration with tough 
conflict is necessary, particularly where a history and practice of community protest exists.85
Prejudice that all civil society is uninterested in thoughtful dialogue needs to be examined.86
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Corporations need closer coordination between government and community affairs.  
Having a designated senior level corporate and government visionary who are responsible for 
piloting and otherwise spearheading innovative efforts can be instrumental to whether dispute 
resolution and multi stakeholder process occurs.87  Someone needs to have clearly defined 
responsibility for each designated step.  Mandated participatory process, like IFC requirements, 
may be necessary.88
Corporations can be guided in recognizing their interests in risk management, protecting 
local and global reputations. Seasoned business stakeholders do recognize that social license to 
operate is essential.89 Respect for what each stakeholder can contribute and the reality that 
without collaboration needed end results cannot be achieved motivates.90 One corporation found 
that inviting community participation moderates “escalating …expectations of unconditional 
benefit.”91
Advances are also possible with dispute resolution process itself.  First, as one corporate 
interviewee expressed, many are still unaware of process options, like mediation, and benefits.  
Education is needed.92  A realistic first step is attempting to measure progress with concrete 
process challenges.  Assessment checklists can be developed.
To create integrity and lasting impact, process conflict must be reconciled before 
attempting substantive discussion. Advised is openly addressing process challenge to facilitate 
87
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stakeholder clarity of expectation and risk.93    Optimally all concerned will carefully define the 
desired role of dispute resolution, agree to ground rules for decision making, and design ADR to 
meet particular needs and interests.94 Ownership grows with participation.  Process loses 
credibility and legitimacy when a powerful stakeholder designs and imposes.  Such attempts are 
dismissed as public relations.95 All must be considered to ensure shared incentives.  
To preserve credibility and garner support, ADR must somehow build genuine and 
inclusive collaboration that adequately considers power imbalance. Democratic process includes 
all necessary stakeholders and is careful not to lose those who lack time and resources.96 Scholar 
Opotow, an expert on moral inclusion, proposes that inclusion must occur at all societal levels 
and across all subpopulations as aspired in South Africa.97
Process inclusion must likewise occur across time, beginning prior to and continuing after 
process.98  Community engagement is built into complex projects at the beginning.  
Recommended is starting with diverse representation, perhaps a coordinating group. 
Additional suggestions include starting with common ground and easiest issues first to build 
trust and surface conflict.99 One interviewee’s top priority is ensuring competence and quality 
among mediators and facilitators.100   Corporate users of mediation and public sector users of 
negotiated rule-making seek enforcement mechanisms like they have with arbitration and judicial 
93
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proceedings.101  Otherwise, they are “forced” into a dual track process--- with court or arbitration 
necessary to enforce mediated agreements.
IV. ADR’s Role Increasing Transparency And Responsiveness .
To advance good governance in the face of corrupt systems,  ADR must somehow encompass 
reform.102 Traditionally corruption has been defined as the abuse of public office for private gain.  
Fundamental institutional reform is arguably good governance’s most pressing concern.103   In 
Latin America, for example, masses of citizens criticize the administration of justice as “slow,
(and) tending to favor those in power.”104
Espoused law does not advance good governance without impartial enforcement.  Likewise,
government initiated ADR must be scrutinized.105  “Conflict is often resolved superficially, and
the transformative potential of mediation, in imparting skills and engaging in structural change, is 
neglected…(M)ediation centers…are often perceived as government agents.”106
A. Citizens Themselves Must Verify Transparent and Responsive Governance.
Governmental and intergovernmental bodies can be less than transparent in sharing how 
dispute resolution relates to official decision making.107  Naturally promises made but not kept 
101 Id.
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103
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trigger and escalate conflict.  Governments further hinder sustainable dispute resolution through 
failure to make binding commitments.  Recommended are clear links between dispute resolution 
and policy making.108
Transparency must be consciously evaluated with alternative dispute resolution as well.  
Some ask for greater transparency with commercial arbitration given its primary adjudication role 
with international disputes.109 It is important to distinguish good governance from “helpful to 
governance,” given ADR’s roots in addressing court overload, or judicial backlog.110  While not 
discounting the value of moving court cases forward or increasing access to affordable dispute 
resolution mechanisms, because the result is better, more responsive governance, the use of ADR 
to relieve congestion alone cannot be credited as good governance without evidence that parties 
evaluate the process and outcome as such.  “It is of the highest moment that those who administer 
justice should always act under public responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to 
satisfy himself with his own eyes (that).. .a public duty is performed.”111
Disputants alienated from corrupt legal systems and governments are demonstrating their
faith in ADR.  Some explicitly embrace alternative dispute resolution as creating “new spaces of 
transparency in the justice system.”112
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B. ADR Can And Does Result In Heightened Transparency.
ADR can incorporate formal commitment to greater transparency.  The AARHUS Treaty 
mentioned earlier includes government commitment to “providing enhanced access to 
information….This will be used to produce a culture of greater openness so that decisions taken 
are more transparent.”113
Transparency was one of the criteria for negotiating South Africa’s transitional 
constitution.114 Meetings were open to the public.115  All materials were accessible through the 
Internet.116
Many companies and some intergovernmental organizations commit to transparency after 
suffering “untold reputational harm” from historic lack.117  Escalating civil society protest 
strategically and forcibly aims for transparency through public awareness campaigns.118
Likewise, global campaigns motivate governments to consider ADR.119
Corporations are free to adopt their own proactive policies and practices of full 
transparency, and have been so advised by NGOs.120  Some establish independent community 
development funds with impartial oversight.   A class action of African American employees 
112
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alleging discrimination at Coca-Cola illustrates mediated commitment to transparency.  After
ordered to mediation in the Northern District of Georgia, the resultant agreement created a 
taskforce to oversee implementation for a period of three years, as well as internal investigation
of on-going complaints.121  Taskforce selection paralleled the selection of international 
commercial arbitration panels—three appointees nominated by Coca-Cola, three by the class 
counsel and one chairperson agreed to by both.122  All appointees needed to satisfy criteria 
negotiated in mediation.
C.  ADR Facilitates Responsiveness to Stakeholder Needs And Higher Quality Outcomes.
All stakeholders, including government, are to free to craft arbitration and other ADR to 
be more responsive than formally established dispute resolution.  Ideally, they will transform the 
“pursuit of privilege (power) into the responsibility for governance.”123 Central to the best of 
governance is a “civil service that is strongly oriented and committed to service.”124
Practically, however, private stakeholders are often best situated to respond to particular 
needs.125  Negotiated rule-making126 is advocated for creating more informed results because 
those impacted design.127   Applied insight and information may not otherwise be available to 
government.  Civil society groups are often more flexible than government bureaucracies, 
allowing them to act quicker and more creatively to newly arising issues and concerns.   Civil 
121
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society is most often acknowledged for closeness to people.128 Including civil society 
stakeholders in ADR process ideally enhances democratic legitimacy. 
Civil society is admonished to maintain its legitimacy through practicing dispute 
resolution within, or using the approaches reviewed here to mobilize constituencies, develop 
shared platforms, and create internal democracy (rather than claim to speak for people who are 
not consulted or considered).129   Uganda and South Africa have both initiated “Installing Codes 
of Conduct” for civil society organizations to ensure accountability.130
To create optimal results, both civil society and government stakeholders must actively 
engage in negotiation.  If a government agency decides to be relatively passive, it hurts its own 
interests as well as civil society (and vice versus).131
Restorative justice132 exemplifies ADR’s ideal of diverse, inclusive process. It is an 
international movement within criminal dispute resolution, promoted as more responsive, 
particularly to minority communities.133  Government continues to oversee criminal justice but 
includes offenders admitting culpability, interested victims and community members in 
127
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negotiating amends.134 At its best, such collaboration shows promise of transforming 
relationships between communities and government and preventing the most horrific of conflict
and crime.135
V.  Inclusive  Multi-Stakeholder Process Presents Challenges ADR Is Prepared To 
Address.
Actors concerned with environmental and other priority international issues, such as ethnic 
conflict, are pioneering multi-stakeholder process136 that meets several criteria for good 
governance.137 Engaging a diverse range of participants, concerned and impacted, is highlighted.  
(E)thnic conflicts are often the product of regimes that
promote feelings of exclusion with certain groups. If
the purpose of transitional justice is to move toward
greater egalitarianism, it is essential to overcome
feelings of exclusion and ensure that decision making
about basic rules will enhance feelings of participation
and inclusion.138
The results are promising.
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A. International Leaders Laud Exemplary Democratic ADR.
One of the most famous examples of inclusive participatory process was South Africa’s 
negotiation of its Peace Accords, which included “political organizations and parties, civic 
organizations, minority groups, security forces, businesses, trade unions, churches and the 
government.”139  A media campaign on television, radio and Internet, meetings in communities 
lacking media access, and wide circulation of a draft Constitution for review, comment and 
objection actively solicited opinions of various groups.140
Likewise, Kofi Annan praises the earlier mentioned AARHUS Convention Process as “the 
most impressive elaboration of Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration, which stresses the need for 
citizens’ participation in environmental issues and for access to information on the environment 
held by public authorities.”141
Fifty five countries of North America, Western, Central and Eastern Europe, and Central Asia
participated.142  NGOs engaged from the very beginning of the process, acting as advisors to 
UNECE while designing the process.143  This process is lauded, compared to other environmental 
treaties, for its focus on the process of decision making as well as outcome.144   It is heralded as a 
model for multilateral policy-making, emulating democratization of global institutions.
139
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140
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Multi stakeholder process, by definition, increases participating stakeholders, listing UN
agencies, other intergovernmental bodies, governments, NGOs, academics, farmers, business and 
industry, trade unions, indigenous people, technical experts, ethics specialists, professional 
associations, media, and affected people as examples.145 The best of multi stakeholder process 
also somehow overcomes feelings of exclusion, engages diverse stakeholders and their opinions, 
and facilitates inclusive decision making.  In tackling the toughest challenges, exemplary
multi stakeholder process powerfully advances democratic self-determination.
B. Global Critique and Recommendation Stress The Need For Authentic 
Representation And Effectively Bridging Cultural Difference.
One World Trust has devoted much research to evaluating effective participation 
(“engagement”) in collaborative process.146  The results emphasize once again the importance of
linking micro and macro level decision making and including the most marginalized and affected 
groups.  Sophisticated convening of dispute resolution undeniably ensures the presence and direct 
voice of a broad array of interests rather than simply those who are more organized or 
powerful.147
Representatives claiming to speak for groups must be checked to ensure legitimacy. 
Representatives who lack close working relationships with their constituencies are a problem.  
They may not even attempt the ratification needed for broader buy-in.148  Such representatives 
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sometimes attempt to conceal conflict with vague language.  Needless to say this approach is not 
sustainable.  
Naturally challenges arise when participants bring basic assumptions and approaches quite 
alien to the collaboration necessary to find common ground and develop the shared platform and 
culture of communication and negotiation.149 Bringing all contending forces “to the table” is 
easier planned than implemented when facing power inequity and ethnic tension.150 Cultural 
difference requires in-depth consideration.   Moreover, inevitable “clash of cultures,” or styles of 
problem-solving, surface, even without ethnic and power difference.  Engineers, scientists and 
other experts are routinely acclaimed for individual achievement rather than partnering with those 
impacted by their findings.151  Business focus on “making a profitable deal” may challenge the 
government expectation of mandated top-down authority, along with politics that tolerate 
whatever means advance advocacy of special interests.152  Political culture can attract 
personalities who view authentic, open communication as foolish and promote manipulation and 
domination instead.  Lobbyists are rewarded for advocating self-interest as competitively as 
possible.  Likewise, activist culture may be feared as intent only on vilifying those with more 
privilege, while simultaneously facing accusations of being co-opted for participation alone.  As a 
result, these groups are too often working at cross purposes, avoiding communication, and
duplicating efforts.
Professor Naomi Roht-Arriza vividly captures the innate concrete conflict emerging from 
professional difference alone.
149 Id.
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practical guidance on ways that governance systems and structures can address power inequality”).
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Integrating post-conflict reconstruction and collective reparations
seems…promising.  Attempts to do so will, however, encounter
difficulties based on differences in vocabulary, professional biases,
restrictive mandates and ease of goals. Neither UNDP or the World
Bank frames issues in terms of reparatory justice, law or rights,
but rather in terms of repair of the consequences of conflict 
and economic growth….In part, this may be due to the predominance
of lawyers in framing reparations issues and the predominance of
economists and engineers in the development world. Post-conflict
work… involves merging the different perspectives of conflict
prevention, humanitarian assistance, human rights monitoring
and traditional development cultures, each with its own “turf,”
time frame and policy prescriptions.  Development aid involves
different, often shorter term and more measurable goals than moral 
and social reconstruction.  ‘It is easier to rebuild roads and bridges than
it is to reconstruct institutions and strengthen a social fabric of society.’…
On the other hand, ‘transitional justice’ and… organizations focused
on reconciliation, justice and rights… have often given short
shrift to economic, social and cultural rights, and have tended
to avoid confronting the complex economic development issues in favor
of a political institution-building approach.153
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Fortunately ADR provides recourse.  Negotiating different perceptions of risk and value, 
such as the worth of endangered species and thousands of jobs, or reduced infant mortality versus 
tons of ore,154 as one instance, requires training in integrative bargaining.155 Polarizing disputes 
by framing as simple “either/or” win-lose paradigms assumes traditional distributive bargaining 
with elementary linear logic.  Integrative bargaining, on the other hand, understands complexity
and interdependence.  Naturally, expected and desired outcomes will differ according to 
stakeholder.  Thus integrative bargaining reframes the conflict as a shared search for options that 
maximize satisfaction for all, without requiring any change in mandates or frameworks.  Parties 
might ask, for example: how can we generate ore and protect infants simultaneously? A five year 
integrative partnering effort is currently being attempted by Rio Tinto, a multi-national mining 
company, and Bird Life International, a global network of environmental non-governmental 
organizations.  They have developed objectives to reflect mutual benefit, focusing equally on 
biodiversity, mining operations and reputation.156
A new conception of identity, the relational self, posits affinity, or “perceived 
resemblance to those with whom one has a common interest.”157  Theorized is that the process of 
identifying shared interest changes identity.  Arguably, alternative dispute resolution, by its 
inherent relational nature alone, bridges and transforms cultural identity.
Many stakeholders, however, benefit by being guided in broadening their decision-making 
approaches.  Professional facilitators, agreed to and trusted by all parties, can be indispensable---
again in the future.  These are not mutually exclusive concepts but they are significantly different starting 
points”).
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assisting with face-saving by, for example, fielding tough questions that participants truly do not 
know how to answer in the moment, such as how government officials can honor mandate while 
participating in uncertain process.158
VI. One Of ADR’s Primary Contributions Is Mediating Diverse Interests For 
Common Good.
ADR is routinely lauded for cost efficiency---time and financial---in contrast to litigation.159
Once again, however, cost efficiency by itself cannot be automatically equated with good 
governance.  
A. Stand Alone Efficiency Can Backfire.
Isolating cost efficiency may actually hinder good governance.160  Rewarding quick 
disbursements, for instance, discourages participatory process.  Pressure for cost efficiency can 
curtail work with the most marginalized.161 Law and economics’ concern with efficiency has 
potential to dominate dispute resolution process at the cost of abandoning deliberation and 
wisdom.162 Efficiency may also mask ineffectiveness with apparent success. Even when none of 
158 See, e.g, Kinga Goncz & Sandor Gesko, Ethnic Minorities in Hungary:  Democracy and Conflict 
Resolution, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOCI. SCI (1997) (describing how Partners for Democratic 
Change successfully facilitated meetings between government and the Roma regarding complaints of 
police discrimination);  see also  SPIDR Environment/Public Disputes Sector Critical Issues Committee, 
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the above is true, the most efficient of process risks being seen as competitive and self-
interested.163
Early intervention in conflict ideally contain costs.  Prevention does. Attempts to maximize 
self-interest with mere lip service to collaboration, however, predictably ventures broken trust and 
backlash.  
B. Relationships And Goals Must Be Balanced For Durable Dispute Resolution.
Eradication of poverty and attracting foreign investment are top priorities in most 
countries.164  Much evidence shows that governance generally improves with wealth.165
Espoused rule of law, no matter how progressive, is not enough without the resources needed to 
actualize.  South Africa’s current constitution exemplifies.  Despite the constitution’s
transformative potential and strong judicial support,166 little tangible impact is evident in the lives 
of those whose rights have been upheld.  “Laws and rulings are not enough without committed 
officials, budgets and money allocations.”167
Professor Antonio Mendoza believes that mediation, collaborative negotiation and similar 
“less efficient” process are central to foreign direct investment, specifically, joint ventures 
requiring horizontal relationships.168  While the agreements negotiated will likely contain some 
rule of law provisions, such as arbitration clauses agreeing to vertical authority in the event of 
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164
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relationship break-down, unlike mere sale of goods, joint ventures by foreign governments and 
private investors require cooperative relationship building.169  While investment agreements exist 
that preference those with the most power and resources, the required accommodation by those 
with less clout risks eroding relationship durability and goodwill.170  Furthermore, there are 
cultures and countries, like Japan, who simply wish to avoid adversarial proceedings, including 
arbitration.171
Dr. Kishan Khoday concurs, asserting that relationships, not rules, have “emerged to manage 
conflicts between the mandates of public agencies, the interests of business and the values of civil
society groups in defining the rules and boundaries of the new global economy.”172 While some 
formal rule of law has emerged, most law is “de facto…being developed and overseen by a 
diverse configuration of social relationships.”173
Support of local authorities can be pivotal to whether international adjudicative dispute 
resolution is able to proceed.174   The reverse is also true.  As a result, in conversations with 
counsel for multinational corporations with presence in Asia, one researcher found that lack of 
confidence in courts’ enforcement of arbitral awards and role with interim measures frequently 
results in mediation or conciliation.175  “(M)ediation cuts through a great deal of bureaucracy and 
can allow parties to face each other and resolve their differences in an informal way.”176  Most 
167
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importantly, mediated agreements create party acceptance of the terms mediated.177  At its best, 
mediation results in durable resolution---the outcome sought by all dispute resolution.
In a study of sixty major corporations, eighty one percent of respondents judged 
mediation as more satisfactory than litigation, with fifty nine percent highlighting the 
preservation of relationships.178  Mediation was the most popular corporate ADR choice, with 
arbitration, mediation-arbitration, in-house grievance and fact finding, peer review, and ombuds 
intervention as the next preferences—in that order.
Optimal conflict resolution embraces the interest of efficiency as well as increased 
participation and cooperation.  In the Philippines, for instance, mediators are rated highly for 
communication and relationship, as well as problem-solving, skills.  Specifically they are 
commended for: 1) ability to identify problems and issues, 2) patience, 3) sensitivity, 4) listening 
with no pressure to settle, and 5) impartiality.179
Interviews conducted for this paper likewise rank cost-effectiveness and efficiency among 
ADR’s benefits, along with the ability to preserve important relationships and proceed 
confidentially.180 Those interviewed further value the ability to custom design creative 
resolutions and preserve reputations. 
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C. Collaborative Process As The Most Efficient Approach To Resolution.
In the face of contentious conflict, collaborative process is likely to prove the most efficient 
of all  options.  “Defensive posturing,”  “political wrangling” and judicial review can prolong 
conflict for years, with no necessary benefit.181 Negotiated rule-making, for example, is 
sometimes the only way to move forward, with conflicts so contested that government agencies 
are otherwise at impasse.182
Critique of complex dispute resolution “from the field” includes these proposals and 
observations. On-going process, rather than one time meetings, improves success.183 Some
multi stakeholder process takes five to ten months.  Other may run for two years or more. 184
Credible process includes all necessary stakeholders and is careful not to lose those who lack 
time and resources.  Taking the time to recognize and address real difference is valued.  Issues are
thoroughly explored.  Agenda setting is kept open so as not to oversimplify and miss important 
issues.185  Social, economic and equity questions “may take time to emerge.”186 Interestingly, 
contracts are faulted for emphasis on the simplest of outputs and failure to consider the more 
complex terms of collaborative efforts, such as expected outcomes.187
A balance, or peace, between concerns can be navigated.  It makes sense to consider 
mediation and ADR hybrids only when value-adding. Recommended is reserving the most
180
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efficient process for disputes with equal bargaining power, where relationships, reputation and 
creativity are not priorities. More complex conflicts with multiple stakeholders or valuing of 
long-term relationships need more involved process.  Advised for transnational corporations, for 
example, are dispute resolution mechanisms that proactively prevent crisis and anticipate
challenges.188
Can we design a model for assessing conflict intricacy and persuading those concerned of the 
value of more elaborate options as complexity grows?189  If a conflict is relatively simple and 
straightforward, like sales of goods, and a simple process will suffice, there is no problem or 
confusion.  When conflicts become more challenging, however, like those involving resistance or 
more than two parties, a model is needed to guide parties, introduce options and encourage 
greater investment and creativity.190  The optimal guide will help parties link and delink issues so 
that relatively straightforward agreements can be reached quickly and easily, with more energy 
reserved for the most problematic.191 The beginnings of such a guide are found in a matrix 
developed by a transnational mining corporation and a global network of environmental NGOs.192
The matrix begins by rating the biodiversity importance of fifty seven different operational areas 
and institutional capacity;   thus guiding attention to the areas of greatest need and importance.193
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VI. ADR Also Furthers Good Governance Through Enforceable Rule of Law.
De Tocqueville asserted that a “properly functioning democratic society fosters…context for 
constraining arbitrary and intrusive state power.”194   When those with power abuse and ignore 
the rights of those they serve, they cannot be trusted to govern.195 A government oppressing a 
group of citizens certainly cannot claim to be impartial.196
While the importance of building durable cross-cultural relationships is explored in the 
preceding section, such relationships are also vulnerable to abuse.  Interestingly, while 
mediation/arbitration is promoted for relationship building, it is simultaneously criticized as 
compromising the impartiality of the arbitrator since he has already heard “confidential” 
disclosures as mediator.197   Likewise, “(w)hat causes lawyers most concern is a mediator 
privately caucusing with each side. A med/arb process may raise questions of bias, real or 
perceived, in the minds of the parties...Equally, as a result of private caucus sessions, the 
mediator may feel biased to one side or other on the basis of what he or she hears in confidence.”
198
A. Impartial Rule of Law Guards Against Corrupt Relationships.
Increasing monitoring systems, legal enforcement and accountability can advance good 
governance.  A rational cost/risk/benefit analysis of human behavior theorizes that increased costs 
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deter.  “Corrupt activities occur when marginal returns from crime exceed the marginal returns 
from legal occupation by more than the expected value of the penalty.”199
The emerging economies of Eastern and central Europe show that quickly establishing rule of 
law can be instrumental to growth and development.200 ADR, like international commercial 
arbitration, provides confidence building infra structure with emerging market economies.  
Foreign parties sometimes feel at a relative disadvantage in local courts:  unfamiliar with 
domestic rules and procedures; fearful of local bias.201  Local courts may be similarly ill-equipped 
to grapple with issues of foreign law.202
Trustworthy rule of law is necessary for all requisites of good governance. “Without a 
minimal level of human rights…local empowerment is an illusion.”203  Tolerating selective 
illegality erodes public confidence and discourages participation.204  To counter, some 
transnational corporations insist on contractual guarantees that contractors and governments will 
respect human rights.205
ADR is unquestionably growing in popularity around the world for its ability to fill critical 
gaps where rule of law is unreliable, corrupt or missing. ADR has the capacity to create 
trustworthy rule of law transcending domestic systems and combining legal traditions.206 Some 
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international multi-stakeholder process, for instance, establishes binding legal agreements.207 At 
its best,208  the rule created is truly impartial—created to oversee all groups and individuals, no 
matter how powerful, and applied equally (“blindly”), to ensure justice.
B. ADR Offers Popular Alternative to Untrustworthy Legal Systems.
Independent alternatives and leadership are particularly needed where courts are controlled 
and pressured politically by the executive branch.209 Lincoln’s role with slavery exemplifies the 
requisite response--true impartiality.  If political fraternity had been priority, Lincoln may have 
allowed States to spread slavery without interference.  If he had revered the judicial system as 
sacred, slavery would have prevailed.  
In a study of sixteen countries and good governance, all but two (Argentina and Chile) report
a much higher trust in community and indigenous dispute resolution than formal courts.210 What 
is purportedly happening with ADR in the Philippines demonstrates the need and resultant 
enthusiasm.   The Philippine courts urgently need vital reforms addressing backlog, corruption 
and systemic biases and inefficiencies.211  In 1999, during a two week National Settlement Period, 
207The AARHUS Convention mentioned earlier is one example noted for linking environmental and human 
rights.
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the Department of Justice referred eighteen hundred cases to mediation.  Most reported 
satisfaction with both the process and the mediator whether or not their case settled.212
The above success sparked a societal trend.  The Supreme Court started mediation in the 
Court of Appeals and the Department of Trade in its consumer protection bureau.  The 
Departments of Environment and Natural Resources and Agrarian Reform “are encouraging 
greater private sector participation in…community wide conflicts over land and resources.”213
The Board of Investments and Intellectual Property Rights office hope to gain a competitive edge 
over other Asian investment destinations through the use of mediation.214
C. True Impartiality Is Pivotal To Good Governance.
“(The) stability of all democratic institutions rests upon a justice system founded on 
principles of equal access, impartiality and independence.”215 “A fair and just result” is named 
primary in evaluating international private commercial arbitration in particular.216 In one survey, 
eighty one percent ranked fairness nearly twice as significant as cost, the monetary award, finality 
and speed of decision, and arbitrator expertise.217
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Yet some developing countries are challenging international commercial arbitral awards as 
unfair.218 In the Philippines, for instance, suspicion of partiality and less party satisfaction is 
expressed when evaluating arbitration.  Requested is increased transparency through 
strengthening appeal mechanisms219 and participation by those from developing countries who 
distrust the system.220  Arbitration seminars can be held in Indonesia as well as London.  “If 
arbitration has nothing to hide, then let them not hide it.”221
An American “proclivity that raises eyebrows abroad” is the practice of interviewing 
potential arbitrators.222  Not surprising, particularly troublesome are attorneys who attempt to 
solicit arbitrator candidate opinions on the merits of their cases.223  This is noteworthy because ex 
parte communications are also present in the corrupt systems that ADR seeks to circumvent.  A 
related concern is the autocratic mediator-arbitrator pushing parties into making “premature and 
unnecessary concessions that interfere with the attainment of high joint benefit.”224
Fortunately, international standards strongly back the impartiality of commercial 
arbitrators.225  Combined with enforcement certainty226 provided by various arbitration treaties, 
particularly the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(“the New York Convention”), international commercial arbitration is growing in use.227
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True impartiality is key to whether alternative dispute resolution advances rather than erodes
good governance.228  Attempting to measure through documented increase in decision-makers’ 
honesty and concern for the public is one avenue, or conversely, decrease in political patronage, 
rent seeking, and special interest influence.  One proposal to increase public confidence and 
decrease the potential for political manipulation with ADR is appointment of multiple member 
panels including members chosen by each of the communities concerned—like the current model 
for international commercial arbitration.229  Multilateral and NGO groups abiding by principles of 
impartiality and neutrality, such as those of the International Committee of the Red Cross, may be 
the most independent and trustworthy if their participation in a particular ADR process is 
feasible.
Building trust between stakeholders, particularly those from different countries, is 
essential.230 An independent and impartial facilitator is seen as superior to one of the 
stakeholders or a related group attempting to lead.  NGOs that fully depend on facilitation income 
are not seen independent.231
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VI. Impartial Panels and Ombuds Are Commended Globally for Independence,
Oversight and Accountability.
Monitoring the results and impact of dispute resolution guards against token efforts.232
Accountability simply means that individuals and institutions 
are answerable for their actions and the consequences that
follow from them…Accountability may take many forms, from
merely ‘taking into account’, so that those affected by decisions
are consulted or considered, to independent inspection,
external monitoring, public reporting, judicial review
and elections.233
Robust accountability requires all stakeholders embracing the tensions of co-existence.234
This truth is often lost in common “finger pointing.”   Government and business need 
independent watchdogs to oversee and stimulate their best, while all stakeholders, including civil 
society, benefit from a stable and reliable legal structure accountable to many rather than one
special interest group.  Ideally, the stronger the nation-state and intergovernmental body, the more 
it allows, even seeks, strong voice and questioning within.  Civil society likewise is learning the 
value of working with government.  As one example, the International Landmine Campaign in 
Africa obtained leverage through engaging rather than confronting the state.
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Civil society stakeholders are generally more independent than government and business 
stakeholders.  Their presence should enhance accountability.  Some NGOs, however, are the 
problem.  They discourage popular participation, waste resources and unknowingly support
corruption.235  They, too, must be held accountable. 
One stated purpose of the dispute resolution surveyed in this article is to produce 
“information from an independent source.”236 Impact studies, monitoring by impartial panels, and 
public access are practical examples, along with the office of ombuds.
An ombuds like process was established in South Africa as part of negotiating the Peace 
Accords.  The Goldstone Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence 
and Intimidation,237 composed of a judge, senior advocate and three other legally qualified 
persons “(i)nvestigated the nature and causes of violence, identifying those responsible and 
recommending action to the state president.”238
Likewise, the Civil and Political Rights Covenant (and its accompanying Protocol) and 
the Convention on Racial Discrimination created Ombuds committees, with representatives from 
eighteen ratifying countries, to oversee worldwide human rights.239  Ex officio experts 
“investigate (on petition) and criticize what the governors do that the governed do not like.”240
Criticized governments are mandated to respond with remedies.
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In 1995 the IFC and MIG created an ombuds division, Office of the Compliance 
Advisor/Ombuds (hereinafter “CAO”), in response to harsh criticism of the World Bank by a 
Chilean NGO.241 The CAO office now investigates such complaints.  In one case CAO arranged 
an independent study of water quality, with monitoring of transparency and impartiality by a 
diverse collectively chosen group of local community representatives.242
The most publicized example of CAO work occurred in Peru last year in response to 
local and NGO complaints of pollution by a local investment (mine).  CAO’s intervention 
elaborates options available to ombuds.  CAO organized a series of trainings for sixty-three 
participants, including politicians and government staff involved with mining, community 
delegates selected for this particular process, mine employees, academics, members of the local 
chamber of commerce, and staff from various NGOs.  Almost one hundred and fifty hours were
provided in dispute resolution, training for trainers, effective communication, mediation, 
consensus building, and case study analysis of sociocultural and economic context.243
Impartiality, inevitably tested with tough political pressure, must be strictly 
maintained.244  It is imperative that all stakeholders be prepared to support and monitor the 
ombuds’ independent role.245  While government often proclaims independent oversight, in 
actuality, NGOs more often serve as true watchdogs.  Environmental Rights Action, for example, 
publicly alleged CAO’s failure to consult with a truly inclusive group of opinion leaders in 
examining Shell and IFC implementation of the Niger Delta Contractor Revolving Credit 
Facility.  Despite this reality, CAO reviewers still found “the risk of perceptions from within the 
241
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institutions that (the ombuds) too consistently adopts the NGO perspective, and from civil society 
that it represents the institutions of which it is a part.”246 Thus ombuds accountability necessitates
further guarding through independent and critical media, a representative decision making body 
that is separate from police and military forces, and education of the individuals being protected 
so they are aware of their rights.247 External evaluation of ombuds oversight, like that described
here, may also be necessary.
CAO reviewers concluded that the ombuds was beneficially impacting its institutions “by 
influencing the agenda and terms of internal debate on challenging issues central to successful 
development.”248  They also found that “senior management and some middle management, and 
most environmental and social development specialists, seem to particularly value…early 
warning.”249
NGOs valued opportunities for review and comment provided by ombuds but  perceived 
that the IFC and MIGA 
are not yet comfortable operating in a climate that demands
accountability, openness and trust…..the natural tendency is 
to have conversations in private….Change and learning with
respect to uncomfortable or painful issues are seldom sought
out and embraced by any large institution… (N)ot all potential
or active clients… understand the business value of
245
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properly managing environmental and social risks and
aggressively growing environmental and social 
opportunities. 250
Outside evaluation recommended that the CAO “carefully evaluate the willingness and 
ability to engage in productive problem solving of the senior management of any company.”251
Party unresponsiveness should be a reason for dismissing a case.  
When establishing their ombuds, IFC and MIGA emphasized that accountability is more 
than financial return. For a development bank, environmental and social performance matter as 
much as financial rate of return.252  Outside review, however, reported that “ there were typically 
no explicit social development goals for IFC projects.253   Such tangible commitment is necessary 
to monitor accountability.254 Reviewers identified a committed external sponsor as the essential
variable in meeting desired environmental and social outcomes.
Conclusion
While scholars scrutinize legal systems around the world, domestic and international, a 
quiet revolution grows.  Practitioners from many fields, law as well as development, public 
administration, and business, along with citizens and NGOs, are crafting alternative forums.  
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They seek access, inclusion, reliability and fair consideration of their needs---in short, good 
governance.
In many countries, parties to conflict face legal ineptitude and barred access. Private 
deals occur behind closed doors.  Alternative dispute resolution provides a ready option where 
accountability, impartiality, rule of law and transparency can be contracted.
ADR’s democracy likewise creates outcomes truly responsive to diverse needs at all 
levels of society.  At its best, ADR transforms, empowering broader democracy, building durable 
relationships, and enriching ability to work effectively.
Of course, questions as well as promises are raised by ADR’s global surge in growth. 
ADR has the capacity to circumvent rule of law and create more corruption as well as promote 
good governance.  What safeguards are necessary to enhance ADR’s contribution to the best of 
governance around the world?  The premise behind this article is that ADR and its relationship to 
good governance deserve scholarly attention and guidance.  
Nelson Mandela recently shared his new vision:  a world order based on partnership and 
mutual respect, in which the benefits of collective human endeavor accrue to all and the
imbalances of the past and their legacy are redressed.   ADR  plays an important part that 
demands scrutiny.
